By comparing the failure risk for both bank types, we find that Islamic banks have a significantly lower risk of failure than that of their conventional peers. This lower risk is based both unconditionally and conditionally on bank-specific (microeconomic) variables as well as macroeconomic and market structure variables. Our findings indicate that the design and implementation of early warning systems for bank failure should recognize the distinct risk profiles of the two bank types.
Introduction
The management and operation of Western commercial banks has been the subject of much debate and research. A sound banking system that maintains credit flows to the private sector has become a primary objective for both policymakers and bank regulators around the globe (Levine and Zervos 1998; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009) . However, mismanagement, poor performance, and bank failures were prominent during the recent financial crisis. One sector of the global financial system that has attracted attention because of its resilience during the recent crisis is Islamic banking. With total bank assets around $1.8 trillion and a strong annual growth rate, Islamic banking is quickly becoming an important part of the global financial system (Ernst and Young 2015; IMF 2015) . Some of the factors that have contributed to the growth of the Islamic banking industry have been the increased demand for products that are compliant with the Islamic Law (Shariah), persistent oil revenues that fuel the core Islamic finance markets, safer and more stable returns on investments, and the operational transformation that has led to enhanced and differentiated products.
Islamic banking is built on a set of principles emanating from the Shariah. These principles differentiate it substantially from conventional banking in terms of financial products and objectives.
In particular, Islamic banking is characterized by the prohibition of interest, complex derivatives, and short-selling. Shariah also bars investments that involve dealings in alcohol, gambling, and tobacco.
Although key observable features distinguish the Islamic banking sector from the rest of the financial system, skeptics still argue that these differences have no practical significance; see, e.g. Khan (2010) . To shed light on this debate, recent studies have compared Islamic and conventional banks on the basis of business models, efficiency, asset quality, credit risk, and stability. 1 To mention a few, Boumedeine and Caby (2009) show that Islamic banks have low volatility in their returns and greater resilience to the impact of crises. Čihák and Hesse (2010) find that the smaller Islamic banks tend to be financially stronger than commercial banks overall. Yet the larger Islamic banks are not as financially stable, which may be due to the challenges in managing credit risk. Beck et al. (2013) conclude that Islamic banks were better capitalized and had higher asset quality that made them relatively less vulnerable to the recent financial crisis. Similar findings are reported in the studies of Moazzam and Zaheer (2013) and Van Wijnbergen and Zaheer (2013) . However, Abedifar et al. (2013) compare the relation between risk and stability for both bank types, including "mixed" banks with both Islamic and 1 Although most studies tend to look at efficiency and stability in isolation, there are a few that examine the link between these concepts (see, e.g., Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and Mamatzakis (2009) and Koetter and Porath (2007) for applications using conventional banks, and Saeed and Izzeldin (2014) for a comparative study between Islamic and conventional banks). However, the exact link between efficiency and stability is not clear cut. For the Islamic versus conventional bank exposition, Kuran (2004) suggests that higher efficiency leads to higher stability, while Beck et al. (2013) finds the inefficient Islamic banks are more stable. Saeed and Izzeldin (2014) offer a nice exposition of the theories linking efficiency and stability in conventional banking. We opt not to address the issue of efficiency and stability in this paper due to data limitations arising from the necessity to use listed banks; we leave it instead for future research.
conventional "windows." While they uncover no significant differences with respect to insolvency risk, their findings regarding credit risk indeed depend on the proxy that is used.
Islamic and conventional banks differ conceptually in many aspects regarding their operations business model which, in turn, may lead to different survival rates. As regards their operations, the "no money for money" principle of Islamic banking implies that risk-sharing practices are embedded on both sides of the bank's balance sheet. Islamic banks' depositors are treated as investment account holders or preferred stockholders with a residual claim to profits but without explicit capital protection; hence, they share the risks of the banks' investments. On the one hand, this is likely to exacerbate the bank's withdrawal risk (Ebrahim, 1999) . On the other hand, religious beliefs may instil a certain loyalty in depositors which would allow banks to pass on realized losses in bad times, thereby achieving some pro-cyclical protection. Islamic banks use two types of funding sources: equity/participation type and fee-based services.
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The equity type is mainly used by large banks due to the relatively high costs involved (e.g., execution and Shariah compliance screening). By contrast, fee-based services offer a more certain source of income without exposure to adverse information and moral hazard issues.
A common theoretical aspect of all Islamic banking financial products is that they are asset-backed which should enhance stability during market distress. Debt contracts are precluded (unless these are backed by tangible assets such as real estate or commodities, that is, Islamic bonds) and thus Islamic banks face important restrictions on how to obtain liquidity. Furthermore, the tradability of Islamic bonds is curtailed by underdeveloped secondary markets in the majority of the countries in question which imposes additional constraints. But Islamic banks are subject to the same market conditions as conventional banks including competitive pressure and having a similar need for protection against deposit withdrawal. Against these risks, Islamic banks withhold more liquidity, maintain profitequalisation reserves (profits in good periods as buffer to reduce volatility of payout in bad periods) and protect depositors/investment accountholders by shifting losses to shareholders (displaced commercial risk). 3 The objectives of Islamic banks do not neatly square with the conventional profit maximization (cost minimisation) dogma. Islamic banks are more likely to be proponents of ethical banking with emphasis on charitable actions and interpersonal trust. Such practices are deeply rooted within the 2 Mudarabah and Musharakah are commonly used equity/participation type of contracts. In Mudarabah an investor (usually an Islamic bank) and an entrepreneur (individual or institutional) enter a joint venture where the bank provides the necessary funds and the entrepreneur provides the know-how. Fee-based services include the widely used contracts of Murabahah and Ijarah. Murabahah is in essence a cost-plus-profit sale. The bank arranges to sell a good to a customer at a premium which incorporates risks, costs and a profit margin. Ijarah is a lease contract where the bank leases an asset to an investor (or consumer) and the latter pays fees for utilising the asset. 3 Islamic banks operating alongside conventional banks are subject to displaced commercial risk which is the risk arising from managing assets on behalf of investment accountholders that is effectively transferred to the Islamic banks' own capital. This risk unfolds as the bank may forgo its profit share on such investment when it considers this essential due to the commercial pressure in order to increase the rate of return payable to investment accountholders.
Islamic banking culture with a dedicated Shariah board overlooking the conformity of products and practices to the Islamic law. The role of Islamic banks as business partners in financing operations, in principle, ought to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard. As such, suppliers of funds may be induced to greater diligence while borrowers' opportunistic behaviour to avoid repayment would be discouraged in fear of social disapproval. 4 Lastly, Islamic banks predominantly focus on large scale financing of infrastructure and real estate projects given that contracts are tailor-made and need to undergo screening for compliance which increases complexity and costs. However, country variations do exist in Islamic banks with regards to clientele profile, operations and availability of financial products.
Following the differences outlined above, we anticipate the risk of failure to differ substantially between the two bank types. Failure risk is multifaceted; it involves credit risk, deposit withdrawal risk, insolvency risk, liquidity risk, and operational risk. For each type of risk, reasonable priors and theoretical arguments imply that Islamic banks are either less or more likely to experience failure than conventional banks. Given the differences in the business model of Islamic and conventional banks, we expect that distinct levels of exposure to all of these risks types might eventually lead to different failure risk profiles. But whether Islamic banks survive longer than conventional banks is an important yet still open empirical question. This paper aims to contribute to a rapidly growing empirical literature by singularly investigating whether differences in failure risk exist between the Islamic banks and the conventional banks. For this purpose, we use the survival analysis to compare the hazard rates across the two bank types and to assess their determinants. While recent papers address the issues that pertain to the credit and insolvency risks of Islamic banks, none estimates their hazard rates directly by using the survival analysis. The survival models circumvent the need for proxies of the failure risk of banks that might lead to a distorted comparison (Abedifar et al. 2013) . Indeed, one of the main advantages of the survival analysis in the present context is that it uses the actual time-to-failure as the main observable variable. The survival functions that identify the probability of survival beyond a certain number of years can also help to identify the determinants of the differential failure risk profiles associated with the two bank groups.
We find that, both unconditionally and conditionally on bank-specific (microeconomic) variables as well as macroeconomic and market structure variables, the Islamic banks exhibit on average lower hazard rates than the conventional banks. In addition, the two bank types differ in their failure-risk sensitivities to several of the covariates that, in turn, confirm that their failure risk profiles are distinct.
The z-score measure, widely-used as bank stability proxy, cannot differentiate between the two bank types in our sample. Bank characteristics explain at least one third of the total variation in the hazard 4 Relatedly, Ostergaard et al. (2015) find that banks in communities with high social capital, such as interpersonal trust, civic engagement and charitable work are more likely to survive compared to banks driven by profit-maximization motives.
rates, while the inclusion of macroeconomic and market structure variables adds another ten percentage points to the survival models' explanatory power. Moreover, the country affiliation has a significant impact on the failure risk for the conventional banks but not for the Islamic banks. This impact suggests that only the conventional banks are locally interconnected from the viewpoint of failure risk.
The findings also indicate that the conceptual differences in the business model of the two bank types are ultimately manifested in their distinct failure risk profiles. Among the bank-level covariates for which the sensitivities of the hazard rates differ across the two bank types, higher leverage and higher margins imply that Islamic banks are less likely to fail, while the opposite effect applies to conventional banks; this finding vividly demonstrates how their modi operandi differ. Among the key macroeconomic factors, high inflation harms the Islamic banks the most, possibly because of their greater reliance on cash reserves and their widespread use of commodities as collateral. The greater banking sector concentration adversely affects the survival propensity of Islamic banks, while it reduces the failure risk of conventional banks; this may relate to the fact that in many markets, the Islamic banks are the new entrants while the conventional banks are the incumbents. Lastly, we show that the survival models that in reduced-form incorporate distinctive features of the Islamic banking system yield more reliable predictions of the risk of Islamic bank failure than general (one-size-fits-all) survival models.
This paper aims to investigate whether differences in failure risk exist between the Islamic banks and the conventional banks. The paper contributes to the literature on Islamic banks in at least three ways.
First, we show that the hazard function of Islamic banks is different from those of conventional banks and provide the first formal tests of the hypothesis that Islamic banks are as equally likely to fail as conventional banks by using a survival analysis that exploits actual bank failures. We also justify why it is more appropriate to adopt models relying on actual bank failures than panel models relying on default risk proxies. The survival framework can deal with censoring effects; hence inferences are based on surviving as well as failed banks, all of which could have started operating at different points in time, thereby eliminating any unaccounted for survivorship bias that earlier studies might suffer from.
Second, the use of the semiparametric Cox proportional hazard model enable us to draw comparisons between both bank types regarding the sensitivity of their failure risk to a comprehensive array of bank characteristics, macroeconomic conditions and market structure variables that extend those previously featured in the literature (see, e.g., Čihák and Hesse 2010 and Beck et al. 2013 ).
Moreover, it has the advantage of not invoking any distributional assumptions with respect to the baseline hazard function.
Third, we show that failure-risk predictions generated through general and bank type-specific models lead to different conclusions. The results highlight the importance of taking into account the distinctiveness of Islamic banks in the context of failure-risk prediction. For instance, an Islamic bank specific model can identify the troubled Islamic banks better than a general model that does not cater for these banks' distinct features. This finding is useful for regulators involved in the design of Early Warning Systems in a financial system where both bank types co-exist.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology and Section 3 describes the data. The empirical findings and implications are gathered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Methodology
We use the survival analysis that is better suited for our purposes than conventional classification techniques, such as the discriminant analysis or the binary logit model. The main reason for using the survival analysis is because it yields estimates of the expected time-to-failure. Second, the parameter estimation can be done with the partial maximum likelihood that requires no distributional assumptions on the time-to-failure. A third reason is that the analysis recognizes the continuous-time nature of the failure probability. Lastly, both censored and complete lifetime data are easily accommodated.
The latter aspect is very appealing because it implies that the survival analysis of the banks' failure risk naturally controls for the fact that the observation period might not represent a bank's entire lifetime. Because the models exploit information on duration or survival time, defined as the actual number of years a bank has been in business, left-censoring is naturally avoided. However, a bank could remain in business beyond the sample, a problem that is known as right-censoring; the likelihood function of the survival models is formulated explicitly to account for the right-censored data.
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Moreover, the survival analysis is a more flexible method to analyze the risk of bank failure than an OLS analysis because an OLS requires a proxy for default or insolvency risk such as the z-score or Merton's distance-to-default. The z-score gives the number of standard deviations that the bank's return on assets (ROA) must drop below its mean in order to deplete equity as a percentage of assets, which leads to insolvency. One of the reasons for the popularity of the z-score is that it can be simply calculated from the ROA and the capital-asset ratio. But it has several drawbacks. One is that it assumes that the probability distribution of the bank's ROA is Gaussian that effectively implies ignoring higher-order moments such as skewness and kurtosis. But it is widely recognized that the Gaussian distribution is a crude (at best, first-order) approximation for financial returns because it presumes symmetry and underestimates downside tail risk. Another drawback to the z-score is that it merely acts as a proxy for the risk of insolvency but it does not convey information on the actual failure event. Because of the distinctive business model of the Islamic banks, it is not necessarily the case that the z-score is 5 For a deeper technical discussion on survival analysis, see Hosmer et al. (1999) and Kalbfleish and Prentice (2002). applicable to them. Moreover, other measures such as Merton's distance-to-default require the use of listed banks that imposes an important constraint on the cross-sectional dimension of the sample.
Banking studies that specifically address the issue of failure risk through the survival analysis follow two strands. The first one makes use of the semiparametric Cox proportional hazard model (Cox 1972 ; henceforth, the Cox model) that has the advantage of not requiring any distributional assumption on the hazard function and hence is a distribution-free approach. An early paper by Lane et al. (1986) adopts this framework to investigate the prediction of failure in the US banking sector. Whalen (1991) and Wheelock and Wilson (2000) extend Lane et al.'s study in terms of the sample. In a different setting, Dabos and Escudero (2004) examine failure in the Argentinean banking sector using the banks' accounting information. More recently, Cole and Wu (2009), Gomez-Gonzalez and Kiefer (2009) and Molina (2002) also use the Cox model to assess conventional bank failure.
The second strand of studies relies on parametric survival models that invoke distributional assumptions (see, e.g., Sales and Tannuri-Pianto (2007) for Brazil ; Evrensel (2008) for a set of developed and developing countries; Männasoo and Mayes (2009) for Eastern Europe). Each of these studies assumes a different distribution for the baseline hazard (i.e., exponential, Weibull, and complementary log-log, respectively) that illustrates the potential problem of misspecification.
We use the Cox model where T ∈ [0, ∞) denotes the time-to-failure that is a random variable with the probability density function f(t) and the cumulative density function F(t) defined as
(1)
The survivor function S(t) gives the probability of surviving beyond year t, and the hazard function or hazard rate h(t) is defined as the instantaneous risk of the bank's disappearance in year t conditional on its existence up to time t. These two crucial functions can be formalized, respectively, as
The object of primary interest in the survival analysis is the hazard rate that must be non-negative but not otherwise constrained, h(t) ≥ 0 , and that provides a time-varying risk of bank failure.
We use the unconditional Kaplan and Meier (1958) estimator of the survivor function S(t) by using actual data on whether a bank failed over the observation window and the time when the failure occurred. The null hypothesis, the equality of the unconditional survival rates for the two bank types, is examined using a log-rank test statistic that is χ ( ) distributed.
Using the same data on bank failure together with the data on a vector of bank-and country-specific covariates, denoted , we can estimate the Cox model that is formalized as
where is a k × 1 unknown parameter vector that represents the sensitivities of interest; (t) is a k × T matrix of the variables for bank accounting statements alongside the market structure and macroeconomic indicators; h (t) is the baseline hazard rate that is assumed to be the same for all of the banks at time t and, if the covariates have been demeaned, can be interpreted as the hazard rate of an "average" bank in the population; h(t| (t)) is the hazard rate and can be interpreted as the failure event rate that a bank fails any time within year t, conditional on its accounting characteristics and macroeconomic environment at the start of year t. A partial maximum likelihood estimation of the Cox model gives β ₁, . . . , β without the need to specify a particular distribution for h (t). A value β > 0
indicates that a rise in the k covariate x increases the failure risk and decreases the survival time.
The exponential coefficient e is called the hazard ratio, and 100 × (e − 1) gives the expected percentage increase in failure risk for a one unit increase in the k covariate.
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We also estimate a more general version of the conditional hazard function known as a shared-frailty
Cox model that allows for other (unaccounted) latent country effects.
h (t| (t)) = h (t)e ( ) ; ν = ln(α )
Over and above the estimates of the sensitivity of failure risk to the observable bank-specific, market structure, and the macroeconomic covariates, , this model enables estimates of the contribution of latent macroeconomic factors to the bank's failure risk profile, ν . Logically, a value ν > 1 indicates that the banks operating in country c have higher hazard rates ceteris paribus. All of the country-level variables enter the model lagged by one year. A likelihood-ratio (LR) test is used to test the significance of the shared-frailty component (ν ) (for details see Gutierrez et al. 2001 ).
We allow for four formulations of the Cox model with shared frailty, hereafter called Models I to IV, respectively. These models are progressively less restrictive in the sense that they allow for decreasingly fewer similarities between the two bank types. Model I is the conditional hazard function The log likelihood function that is maximized to estimate the sensitivities, , is a partial log likelihood function as it is confined to the failure times and does not consider times when there is no failure. Thus, the only data that enter the log likelihood are the values of the covariates for both the failed and non-failed banks at the end of the sample years that immediately precede each of the observed failure times ( ₁), . . . , ( ), . . . , ( ), where is the number of banks that failed during the sample period, and − is the number of survivors. bank types. Model II adds interaction terms between the control variables and the Islamic bank dummy, thereby allowing for the sensitivity of the hazard rate to each variable to differ between the two bank types. Models III and IV are fitted to the Islamic banks and the conventional banks separately. They can be viewed as unrestricted in the sense that they allow for more differences between the two bank types compared to Models I and II. Such differences are manifested in the marginal effect of each covariate to the hazard rate (the sensitivities) and in the baseline hazard function.
For each of the four models, we consider two variants. The first uses only bank-specific variables sourced from accounting statements. The second adds the market structure and the macroeconomic variables. The estimation is carried out by using the partial maximum likelihood and Efron's (1977) approximation for tied events that refers to banks failing within the same time interval, 7 while the inferences are based on the Huber-White standard errors that are robust to within-cluster correlations to the failure risk. A class or cluster can be defined by type, for example, Islamic banks versus conventional banks, or by geographic location. The variable selection is done through a general-tospecific procedure. Building on Lane et al. (1986) , we use a forward-and-backward variable selection procedure. For each full set of K bank-specific variables and the market structure and macroeconomic variables, we start by comparing the K regressor and the K − 1 regressor models where one model is retained on the basis of two criteria: the significance of the covariates according to the p-values of the individual LR tests, and the degrees-of-freedom-adjusted explanatory power as given by the Akaike information criterion (AIC). Forward-and-backward means that variables can be added or dropped. (2010) use the former since they tend not to "beautify" a bank's financial status. Beck et al. (2013) use unconsolidated data to separately consider Islamic windows. Table 1 shows the number of the Islamic and conventional banks for each country versus those available in Bankscope as of 2010. The table indicates that our sample has good coverage, with more than 90% of both banking systems represented, and it is somewhat more representative of the Islamic 7 Interval-censoring arises from the imprecise measurement of time-to-failure. All we know is that a bank has failed within a certain month (this can be considered a limitation of Bankscope). The problem then is that in the event of more than one failure in any given month we do not observe the exact ordering of events. In the survival analysis, tied events are often handed via approximations. We use Efron's (1977) approximation to compromise between speed and accuracy (Cleves et al. 2010 ).
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The only exception is Iran where there are no conventional banks.
banking sector than those in previous studies because it contains 106 Islamic banks (25% of all banks sampled) whereas the studies by Čihák and Hesse (2010), Abedifar et al. (2012) , and Beck et al. (2013) contain 77 (16%), 101 (22%) and 88 (17%), respectively.
[ Table 1 
Dependent and independent variables
The dependent variable in the survival models is the time it takes a bank to fail after its inception. The main input is thus the observed failure event: the failure indicator is a binary dummy variable that takes the value of one in the year immediately prior to the actual failure and zero else. This variable equals zero for the surviving banks in all of the sample years.
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In this study, a bank fails when any of the following criteria occurs: bankruptcy; dissolution; liquidation; negative net worth; state intervention, such as nationalization or capital injection; merger; or acquisition (Heffernan 2005) . The main data source for bank failures is Bankscope but we cross-check the failed banks with the International Finance Information Service (IFIS), Islamic Development Bank (IDB), and the Zawya databases.
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The main independent variable of interest is a binary Islamic bank indicator that equals one for banks operating under Shariah law and zero otherwise. The Islamic banks are identified from Bankscope data and cross-checked with the IFIS, IDB, and Zawya databases. The sample covers primarily full-fledged Islamic banks. The Islamic windows are included where unconsolidated accounts exist; e.g., it is common for Islamic and conventional banks in Malaysia to coexist within a bank holding company. The column entries of the matrix (t) in equations (5) and (6) include the Islamic bank indicator and a broad set of control variables. In choosing the latter we are guided by the literature and consider bank-specific variables, macroeconomic variables, and market structure variables.
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As a robustness check, we conduct the 1 st -99 th winsorization by using all of the (survived and failed) observations. Although the main findings are not challenged, we observe slightly worse goodness-of-fit statistics. The results are available on request. 
Bank-specific variables
The bank-specific variables are categorized according to the CAMELS framework of standardized accounting measures of capital, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk. The analyses based on the survival models provide evidence that the accounting information is a relevant input in predicting the failure risk of the conventional banks. For instance, Lane et al. (1986) identify certain bank-specific characteristics as early signals of bank distress in the US during the period from 1979 to 1984 that include capital (leverage) ratios, earnings (operating expense/income), and liquidity (loans/assets) indicators. For European transition economies over the period from 1995 to 2004, Männasoo and Mayes (2009) show that high levels of leverage and operating costs are significantly linked with a higher risk of bank failure.
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Besides considering the financial ratios in line with the CAMELS framework, 13 we draw information from the balance sheet and the income statement.
Overall, our set of bank-specific variables is far wider than those used in previous studies that allows us to better capture not only the multifaceted aspects of failure risk but also the potential differences between the two bank types. We feature eight balance sheet variables and 12 financial ratios whereas Čihák and Hesse (2010) include only assets as a balance sheet covariate and three financial ratios while Abedifar et al. (2013) consider two financial ratios. The monetary variables are adjusted for inflationary pressure by the country's GDP deflator. 
Macroeconomic variables
There is evidence that economic downturns have an adverse effect on the banks' financial stability; see, for example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Männasoo and Mayes (2009) . Our set of macroeconomic variables consists of real GDP growth, inflation, FX rate depreciation, and sovereign rating. The inflation is computed as the year-on-year logarithmic change in the GDP deflator. The FX rate depreciation is computed as the year-on-year logarithmic change in the spot exchange rate that is defined as the local currency per US$. The sovereign rating equals one for countries with a rating of BBB⁻ or better (investment grade), 0.5 for a rating of BB⁺ or below (noninvestment grade), and zero for nonrated countries at year-end.
Market structure variables
In terms of market structure we focus on the banking sector's concentration and the Islamic banks' share. Our concentration measure is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI). In line with the previous studies, the HHI is computed as the sum of the squared normalized market shares at year-end that are defined by the total assets (see e.g., Bikker and Haaf 2002; Čihák and Hesse 2010; Abedifar et al. 2012) .
The HHI ranges between zero and 100% and is calculated at the country level. On the debate between the banking sector's concentration and stability, one view invokes the "too-big-to-fail" concept 12 Accounting ratios are also good indicators of corporate default risk (see, e.g., Duffie et al. 2007 ).
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Management and sensitivity-to-market-risk variables are not included due to data constraints. 14 Ownership information from Bankscope or the other data sources we could access is scarce. Therefore, we do not have an ownership variable. Nevertheless, it is well known that Islamic banks are primarily domestically owned.
according to which a more concentrated banking environment increases moral hazard and risk taking (Mishkin 1999) . Another view contends that larger profits in more concentrated banking sectors moderate the banks' risk-taking behavior (Allen and Gale 2004) . The research also shows that intense banking competition increases the hazard of bank failure (see, e.g., Matutes and Vives 2000; Beck et al. 2006) . The Islamic banks' share is calculated as the total assets of the Islamic banks over the total banking assets at year-end. A negative coefficient for this covariate in the all-countries pooled survival model suggests, indirectly, that the larger the presence of the Islamic banks in a country the greater the stability of its financial system. 15 The dependent variable and the full set of independent variables considered in our survival analysis are listed in Table 2 . The descriptive statistics for the independent variables are provided in Table 3 .
[ Tables 2 and 3 around here]
Preliminary data analysis
As an initial comparison of the two bank types, we summarize their accounting profiles in Table 4 , columns I to XII. The table also reports the t-tests on the mean difference This similarity might be a reflection of the fact that most Islamic banks primarily use fee-based rather than equity-based contracts because of lower administration costs, complexities, risks, and durations (Abedifar et al. 2013 ).
[ Table 4 around here] Despite their smaller size, the Islamic banks are better capitalized than the conventional banks as borne out, for example, by equity to assets and Tier 1 ratios of 21.7% (against 10.8%) and 25.0% (against 15.8%) respectively. The asset quality of their loan portfolios is also better for Islamic banks, as evidenced by a loan loss reserves to loans ratio of 6.8% (against 7.9%). This quality could be explained by the ability of Islamic banks to pass business related risks to depositors and investment accountholders and the relatively low default rates of Islamic borrowers that arises possibly from their religious beliefs (Baele et al. 2014) . The Islamic banks are more liquid than the conventional banks as suggested by higher liquid assets to deposits at 55.7% (against 40.3%) and lower net loans to assets at 49.8% (against 51.5%). The combined relatively low leverage and high liquidity of Islamic banks might relate to restrictions imposed by the business model instead of the inefficiencies emanating from mismanagement or poor performance.
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In terms of operations, the Islamic banks are more profitable than the conventional banks, as evidenced by the higher ROA (2.1% against 0.9%). The higher ROE of the conventional banks might reflect their overleveraged balance sheets, in contrast with the practices in the Islamic banks. The higher net interest margins commanded by the Islamic banks (6.6% against 4.1%) might be attributed to similarities they share with private banks as they focus on macro-financing such as infrastructure and real estate. By contrast, retail banking and small-medium-enterprise financing are likely to be more competitive areas that are served mainly by the conventional banks that cannot afford to charge their clients high interest margins. Regarding costs, the Islamic banks show significantly higher cost-to-income ratios than the conventional banks, which confirms that they are typically less cost efficient.
In columns III and IV of Table 4 , we compare the accounting profiles of surviving and failed banks.
The failed banks are significantly smaller than the surviving banks in terms of size and turnover. The failed banks' equity and net income equal $0.20b and $0.08b, respectively, for the Islamic banks versus $5.10b and $0.24b for the surviving banks. The failed banks are in a significantly worse financial position by capital quality indicators (8.5% against 13.2% for equity/assets), liquidity indicators (55.5% against 50.8% for net loans/assets), and earnings indicators (0.7% against 1.3% for ROA). Hence, the critical conditions for the failed banks show up in their accounting information. Columns V to VIII of Table 4 suggest that differences between the surviving and the failed banks' accounting statements manifest themselves for both the Islamic and the conventional banks primarily with regards to the balance sheet and the income statement variables. Overall, this analysis confirms that the surviving banks, irrespective of the bank type, are characterized by a stronger financial profile than the failed banks. The last section of Table 4 (columns IX to XII) serves to verify the concept that the accounting profile of the Islamic banks is different from that of the conventional banks, irrespective of their status of surviving or failing. Table 4 shows that all of the accounting variables and financial ratios support the hypothesis that the Islamic and the conventional banking models are distinct; thus clearly setting the scene for the differentiated treatment with respect to the modeling and prediction of failure risk. 18 Some studies find that managerial competency is higher for the Islamic banks than for the conventional banks. Yet the Islamic banking system, due to constraints imposed by Shariah law, is less efficient than the conventional one (Johnes et al. 2014; Abdul-Majid et al. 2010) 4 Empirical results
Unconditional survivor function estimates
In this subsection, we test the hypothesis of equal survival rates for the two bank types. Panel A of Figure 1 graphs the unconditional survival function, S(t), t = 1, … ,30 years, that is obtained for each bank type with the Kaplan-Meier estimator of the observed bank failures.
[ Figure 1 around here] Panel A shows that the probabilities of survival beyond 20 years are 91% (Islamic banks) and 84% (conventional banks). These probabilities fall to 86% and 77% respectively when the time-to-failure is extended to 30 years. 
Conditional survival function estimates
In this subsection, we discuss the failure-risk sensitivities to bank and macroeconomic conditions. Table   5 shows the results of the four distinct formulations of the shared-frailty Cox model (Models I to IV) based on balance sheet information.
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Tables 6 and 7 show the estimation results for the counterpart models based on the accounting variables of the income statement and the financial ratios, respectively.
[ Tables 5-7 around here] In Table 5 , Models I and II show that the estimated coefficients are significant with a negative sign after controlling for bank-specific, macroeconomic, and latent country variables and is suggestive of 19 For the Islamic banks there are no recorded failures beyond this point as these banks are generally younger.
The validity of the proportional hazards assumption that underpins the Cox model is assessed via the Schoenfeld (1982) residuals-based statistic. The null hypothesis is that, although bank failure risk is itself time-varying, the bank-level and macroeconomic covariates contribute to the hazard rate in the same proportion at any point in time. Table 5 shows the similarities and differences between the two bank types with respect to the balance sheet information. The positive coefficients of assets in Models I and II for both variants supports the view that the large banks might take on more risks by relying on the "too-big-to-fail" concept. This reliance might be indicative of the systemically important role of the large banks within each country.
The result is in line with the literature that finds systemically important banks are insensitive to capital discipline measures; instead they try to maximize the added value from the financial safety net they enjoy (Hovakimian and Kane 2000). The growth of loans has a negative coefficient that implies that an expansion in loan portfolios is not necessarily (as is often thought) associated with a higher probability of failure. This is plausible given that our sample countries had no strong experience with a credit boom and bust (e.g., 2007 credit crunch) during the sample period. In addition, their banking systems were less leveraged than those of the West (IMF 2011). By contrast, for the Islamic banks the positive coefficient implies that the expansion in "loan portfolios" (these typically include equity-participation forms of financing) might increase the failure risk. The Islamic banks do not practice equity financing due to moral hazard and adverse selection attributes (Khan 2010) . They prefer instead the certainty of collateralized fee-based contracts. The growth of equity lessens the failure risk for both bank types, possibly reflecting the fact that increased contributions by shareholders work as a safety net. However, the effect is less pronounced for the Islamic banks. The sensitivities of failure risk to financial ratios 22 are reported in Table 7 . The statistically significant differences between the two bank types in most of the estimated sensitivities stresses further that their failure risk profiles are not alike. The cost inefficiencies, as measured by the cost/income ratio, increase the hazard only for the conventional banks. The previous studies find that the Islamic banks are less cost efficient than the conventional banks (see Ahmad et al. 1998) . Newer empirical evidence suggests that the human capital investments on behalf of the Islamic banks have been paying off as they contribute toward closing the gap in managerial inadequacies (Johnes et al. 2014) . The higher liquidity, as represented by liquid assets/deposits, has a favorable effect on both types of banks. This finding highlights the importance of liquidity management in Islamic banks; maintaining high buffers is key to overcoming their Shariah law related restrictions on generating funds through open market operations.
The higher capitalization level (equity/assets) decreases the failure risk for conventional banks but increases it for Islamic banks. A rationale for this finding draws upon the link between leverage, the inverse of capitalization, and profitability. A bank's exact leverage is influenced by both internal (managerial preferences) and external (regulation) factors, which may vary across bank types. Islamic banks operates on lower leverage levels than conventional banks due to their restrictions on the use of debt instruments, such as loans. Indeed, Islamic banks are precluded from attaching a fixed and predetermined interest rate on either side of their balance sheet items and instead, depend mainly on equity participation for the supply and demand of funds. There are Islamic financial instruments that could be used to increase the funds channelled to investments through asset/commodity repo agreements. However, these are fairly complicated and do not have a universal approval.
Consequently Islamic banks cannot match the leverage levels of conventional banks, which is verified by our own analysis and the literature (see e.g., Beck et al. 2013; Olson and Zoubi, 2008) . This places more strain on the Islamic banks in competing with the profitability levels of conventional banks, thereby requiring Islamic banks either to invest in higher risk/reward projects or potentially be driven off the market. As such, the marginal gain from leveraging would be higher in Islamic than conventional banks by enabling the former to contribute more funds to their investments. Arguably, Islamic banks have the necessary mechanisms that provide discipline and prohibit leverage abuse in place. Depositors and investment accountholders are incentivized to monitor performance (given the uncertainty in payouts) that is achieved through the equity-type contractual agreements. The use of investment
21
As a robustness check we repeat the analysis by narrowing our definition of failed banks to exclude mergers and acquisitions. The results do not challenge our main findings and are omitted for brevity.
22
Due to insufficient data on asset quality (loan loss reserves, Tier 1 ratio) these variables are excluded. Nonperforming loans, ROA, and ROE have not been qualified based on our automatic variable selection process. As a robustness check we insert them into the model but they never reach statistical significance. These versions of Table 7 are available on request.
accountholders resembles the use of subordinated debt as a way to monitor bank activities through increased withdrawal risk, which has received some support in the conventional banking system (Wall, 1989) . This supports the positive leverage-profitability link, 23 which has received additional support in a different context (DeAngelo and Stulz, 2015) , and therefore a positive leverage-survival relationship.
Moreover the finding is in line with Abedifar et al. (2013) where high leverage is associated with low credit risk for Islamic banks.
The higher values of the net interest margin (NIM), aggravate (lessen) the failure risk of conventional (Islamic) banks. Over the years there is a tendency for the NIM of conventional banks to decrease which has been attributed to the increasingly diversified sources of income of these banks (Liebeg and Schwaiger, 2006) . Therefore, and as competition further reduces the NIM, a positive relation between NIM and failure risk can be expected. By contrast, Islamic banks do not have such diversified income streams, which is mainly attributed to their small size and the restrictions pertaining to their business model. Additionally, for cost related reasons Islamic banks do not have a strong presence in the retail sector; they specialise instead in real estate, oil drilling and infrastructure projects, where large NIMs can typically be sustained. Consequently, for Islamic banks a negative relation between NIMs and failure risk is plausible.
Next we analyze the sensitivity of failure risk to macroeconomic and market structure variables. The generalized Cox model in Tables 5 through 7 shows a link between the growth of real GDP and the failure risk and offers a noteworthy contrast between the two bank types. An increase in economic growth of 1% delivers about a 6.7% reduction in the failure risk for the conventional banks, with a more muted effect for the Islamic banks. Inflation is a major source of concern for Islamic banks as they are more prone to inflation pressure, as displayed by the results. Specifically, a 1% rise in inflation leads to a 13.9% increase in the failure risk for the Islamic banks and to a 3.7% increase for the conventional banks. This greater sensitivity of the Islamic banks to inflation may be attributed to the fact that most of the Islamic contracts (e.g., profit-and-loss sharing contracts) have a fixed maturity and cannot be inflation-linked by construction. Hence any costs due to adverse inflationary pressure have to be borne by the bank (it is also not permitted by Shariah restrictions to access specialized derivative hedging instruments available to conventional banks, e.g., swaps). In terms of market structure, an increase of 1% in the banking sector's concentration (HHI index) lessens the failure risk by about 9.7% for the conventional banks. This is in line with the concept that a lower degree of sector concentration (and 23 Leverage impacts Islamic and conventional banks in different ways, which might explain the finding that higher leverage increases (reduces) survival rates of Islamic (conventional) banks. Fully understanding the link between leverage and stability in the two bank types requires an appreciation of the relation between leverage and profitability, which can be illustrated by the two main theories on capital structure: the pecking order (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and the trade-off theory (Bradley et al. 1984) . The pecking order theory assumes a negative leverage-profitability relation and applies more to companies. The tradeoff theory is particularly relevant for banks (Toumi et al. 2011 ). It assumes a positive leverage-profitability relation and posits that higher leverage allows a bank to raise its profitability by committing more funds to investments (i.e., leverage multiplier effect). Under this theory higher leverage can lead to higher profitability and hence higher survival. potentially more intense competition) undermines prudent bank behavior by encouraging excessive risk taking. For the Islamic banks, the effect of concentration is suggestive of the increased failure risk that emanates from the increased concentration. Specifically, a 1% rise in the concentration leads to a 3.4% increase in the failure risk.
In terms of goodness-of-fit measures, we observe that the McFadden pseudo-R² statistics reported in Tables 5 through 7 are very close for the models based on the bank-and country-specific variables and the models based on the bank-specific variables. This similarity suggests that the accounting statement variables carry most of the predictive power. It is also noticeable that the additional explanatory power attained by adding country (macroeconomic and market structure) factors into the survival model is roughly two times larger for the Islamic banks than the conventional banks. This finding clearly shows that the Islamic banks are more sensitive to the economic environment and market structure effects than the conventional banks. The finding is also reaffirmed by the percentage increase in the AIC, BIC, and the log-likelihood. For both bank types, a classification of the accounting statement components in terms of their explanatory power shows that the financial ratios outperform the income statement and the balance sheet variables by 4.3% and 6.5%, respectively. The hypothesis that the shared-frailty α in equation (6) is negligible is assessed through a LR test for the restriction H₀: θ = 0, where θ is the variance of the probability distribution of α . The results reported in the diagnostics section of Tables 5 through 7 indicate that the hypothesis is only rejected for the conventional banks. Thus, the latent country variables induce domestic correlation in the failure risk but only for conventional banks. The Islamic banking products and practices might be deemed as not contributing to the susceptibility of the financial system to systemic crises which is plausible given their resilience in the recent financial crisis. By contrast, the conventional banking business model together with regulatory measures (e.g., Basel II) act pro-cyclically in the sense that they aggravate the impact of banking crises on the financial system in terms of duration and intensity (Daníelsson et al. 2001 ).
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In sum, we find that Islamic banks exhibit lower failure risk than conventional banks after controlling for the accounting statement information, market structure, and the macroeconomic environment; the latter has greater relevance for the Islamic bank failure. For both bank types, the risk of failure is sensitive mostly to accounting indicators from the income statement and financial ratios but there are differences between the two bank types regarding the magnitude and even the sign of the sensitivities.
Differential predictability
In this subsection, we demonstrate that a risk model tailored to the conventional banks cannot accurately predict the Islamic banks' failure and vice versa. The coefficient estimates of the models based on bankand country-specific variables that use all of the banks (Models I and II), Islamic banks (Model III) and conventional banks (Model IV) are used to generate hazard rate predictions that can be grouped into three categories: all banks, Islamic banks, and conventional banks. The predicted hazard rates are summarized by operation status (surviving/failed) within each category. Further, we formally compare the distribution of hazard rates for the failed and the surviving banks within each category by using two statistics: the t-test for the null hypothesis of equal means and the Mann-Whitney test for the null hypothesis of equal medians. Table 8 reports the results for Models I to IV with the bank-specific variables drawn from the financial ratios. This subsection illustrates the value added by the survival analysis versus a standard OLS analysis based on the z-score proxy. The initial summary statistics and tests reported in Table 4 suggested that the zscore is significantly higher for the Islamic banks than the conventional banks; this implies, in principle, that the former financial intermediaries are subject to lower insolvency risk. However, the fact that neither the failed Islamic banks nor the failed conventional banks have significantly lower z-scores than their surviving counterparts suggests that insolvency risk is not tantamount to failure risk; namely, the z-score is not able to capture the complex nature of failure risk. To shed further light on this issue, we estimate one of the OLS models 25 considered in the Čihák and Hesse (2010) study but with our data.
The dependent variable is the z-score and the regressors are the accounting statement and the macroeconomic variables. Table 9 reports the estimation results obtained with two distinct samples.
The first sample includes surviving banks only (Model A), as in Čihák and Hesse (2010). The second sample considers all of the surviving and the failed banks (Model B).
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The estimation results for Model A broadly confirm those in Čihák and Hesse (2010). The coefficient of the Islamic bank dummy is positive and significant at the 5% level suggesting that the failure risk (the inverse of the z-score) of Islamic banks is lower than that of conventional banks, in line with our survival analysis. However, the Islamic bank binary variable is insignificant in Model B; prima facie, this suggests that the z-score regression, because it does not account for the survivorship bias, cannot accurately pick up the difference in the failure risk profiles of the two bank types.
Model B shows that the Islamic banks do not have significantly higher z-scores than the conventional banks, which seemingly contradicts our main finding that the Islamic banks are less prone to fail than the conventional banks. One explanation for the seemingly contradictory findings is that the presumption that the z-score is an equally 'valid' proxy for the failure risk in the Islamic and the conventional banks might be erroneous. A complementary explanation is that the type of risk captured by the OLS models for the z-score (insolvency risk) is not strictly equivalent to the risk captured by the survival models that rely directly on bank failures. In this light, the findings suggest that Islamic banks have lower failure risk than conventional banks, but the two bank types are more aligned in terms of insolvency risk. Relatedly, Abedifar et al. (2013) find no differences in insolvency risk between Islamic and conventional banks after controlling for bank-level and macroeconomic conditions. As a final check on the suitability of the z-score to discriminate between Islamic and conventional banks in terms of the failure risk, we estimate (by maximum likelihood) two logit models, Models C and D in Table 9 , where the dependent variable is the failure dummy. In Model C the explanatory (Table 7) , the coefficient of the Islamic bank binary variable is -1.435 (p-value is 0.009) and that of the z-score is 0.012 (p-value is 0). Hence, the inclusion of the controls is immaterial to our main conclusions on the lack of a meaningful relation between the z-score and failure risk. These findings further indicate that the z-score serves as a proxy for a risk that is not strictly equivalent to the failure risk.
These findings can be rationalized as follows. The conventional proxies for bank failure risk were designed with the conventional business model in mind and consequently can lead to fallacious conclusions when applied to Islamic banks given the specificities of their business model. For example, the PLS arrangements on the asset and the liability sides of an Islamic bank's balance sheet enable the bank to pass through any risk associated with its investments to the depositors and investment accountholders. This pass through provides the bank with a layer of protection over and above the usual capital cushion, which undermines the z-score. Moreover, the results in this subsection, which to the best of our knowledge represent novel evidence on this issue, indicate that the insolvency risk that the z-score is designed to capture is not necessarily tantamount to the risk of actual failure.
Conclusions
Islamic banking and finance has experienced an extraordinary expansion during the last three decades. This paper contributes to a growing empirical literature that compares Islamic banks with conventional banks. Our yardstick for comparison is the risk of failure and its sensitivity to bank-level, market structure, and macroeconomic factors. We use the survival analysis, a novel methodological approach in the present context, that has two advantages over the approaches used in the previous Islamic banking studies. Survival models sidestep reliance on the z-score or similar distance-to-default proxies that are suspect in the context of the Islamic banking business model. In addition, the survival analysis is built on models where time-to-failure is the stochastic variable of interest. Hence, the failure risk is effectively treated as a time-varying latent variable that thereby imposes no specific distributional assumption on the estimates.
Our empirical investigation provides, firstly, unconditional and conditional measures of failure risk for the Islamic and the conventional banks. Second, we identify relevant contrasts between the two bank types in the sensitivity of the failure risk to accounting statement variables, macroeconomic indicators, and latent country factors. Third, we examine the predictive power of distinct survival type models estimated from pooled information both from banking systems and from information specific to each.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper in the literature to conduct such exercises. Fourth, we show that survival models lead to substantially different conclusions to those of the z-score. This is important as many papers rely on the z-score to draw inferences on banks' stability and more recently to compare the stability of Islamic banks and conventional banks.
The unconditional survival functions obtained using the nonparametric Kaplan-Meier estimator, which relies exclusively on failure data, indicate that the failure risk of small Islamic banks is significantly lower than that of small conventional banks. The conditional survival functions obtained via the Cox models that control for observed bank heterogeneity (including total assets as a proxy for size), observed country-level heterogeneity, and latent country effects confirm that the Islamic banks are generally less hazardous than the conventional banks.
We document important differences in the sensitivity of failure risk. The higher leverage aggravates the failure risk for the conventional banks but moderates it for the Islamic banks. The higher liquidity is associated with lower failure risk in general, but it is significantly stronger for the Islamic banks, which might relate to the constraints imposed by the Shariah law on their funding. A rise in the net interest revenue increases (decreases) the hazard of bank failure for the conventional banks (Islamic banks) possibly as a reflection of their different clienteles. The cost-to-income has an adverse effect on the failure risk of both bank types but the Islamic banks are more sensitive. This is unsurprising given their larger operational risk. A banking sector's lower concentration decreases the likelihood of failure for the Islamic banks but exacerbates it for the conventional banks. The failure risk for Islamic banks is more strongly affected by inflation. The latent country factors play a negligible role as the drivers of failure risk for the Islamic banks but are strongly significant for the conventional banks. This role might reflect a larger probability of domestic co-failure for the conventional banks. The failure risk and insolvency risk are shown to be not strictly equivalent. The Islamic banks are significantly less risky than the conventional banks in terms of their failure hazard but the two types of banks are difficult to separate in terms of the distance-to-insolvency z-score proxy.
Our findings suggest that bank heterogeneity across accounting information should be closely monitored to identify financial distress. There are also macroeconomic policy implications because the failure risk of the Islamic banks shows a stronger sensitivity to a country's inflation than the failure risk of the conventional banks. Our findings therefore provide evidence in favor of differentiated failure risk models for the two bank types. As such, an early warning system purposely designed that uses historical data for the conventional banks is likely to provide distorted signals if it is applied to the Islamic banks. 3  2  5  1  1  2  300  200  250  Egypt  2  31  33  2  23  25  100  135  132  Indonesia  1  74  75  1  72  73  100  103  103  Iran  15  0  15  16  0  16  94  100  94  Jordan  2  11  13  3  10  13  67  110  100  Kuwait  8  6  14  7  7  14  114  86  100  Malaysia  14  35  49  16  28  44  88  125  111  Mauritania  1  2  3  1  7  8  100  29  38  Pakistan  6  21  27  9  22  31  67  95  87  Palestine  1  1  2  1  3  4  100  33  50  Qatar  4  6  10  4  7  11  100  86  91  Saudi Arabia  3  10  13  3  9  12  100  111  108  Sudan  8  2  10  11  12  23  73  17  43  Tunisia  1  11  12  1  16  17  100  69  71  Turkey  4  41  45  4  29  33  100  141  136  UAE  9  16  25  10  18  28  90  89  89  Yemen  4  5  9  4  5  9  100  100  100   Total  106  315  421  116  327  443  91  96  95 denote significance of the t-statistic for the mean equality of each pair of columns from left to right at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively Table 5 The Cox survival model based on balance sheet variables and country variables. The table reports the β sensitivities and the standard errors in parentheses from the Cox model, eq. (6), estimated for pooled banks (Model I and II), Islamic banks (Model III), and conventional banks (Model IV). In each model the first (second) column reports a specification that considers only bank-specific conditioning variables (both bank-and country-specific conditioning variables). The selection of conditioning factors is based on a forward-and-backward algorithm on the basis of individual significance (LR tests) and overall goodness-of-fit according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC , and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively Table 6 The Cox survival model based on income statement variables and country variables. The table reports the β sensitivities and the standard errors in parentheses from the Cox model, eq. (6), estimated for pooled banks (Model I and II), Islamic banks (Model III), and conventional banks (Model IV). In each model the first (second) column reports a specification that considers only bankspecific conditioning variables (both bank-and country-specific conditioning variables). The selection of conditioning factors is based on a forward-and-backward algorithm on the basis of individual significance (LR tests) and overall goodness-of-fit according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC , and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively Table 7 The Cox survival model based on financial ratios and country variables. The table reports the β sensitivities and the standard errors in parentheses from the Cox model, eq. (6), estimated for pooled banks (Model I and II), Islamic banks (Model III), and conventional banks (Model IV). In each model the first (second) column reports a specification that considers only bank-specific conditioning variables (both bank-and country-specific conditioning variables). The selection of conditioning factors is based on a forward-and-backward algorithm on the basis of individual significance (LR tests) and overall goodness-of-fit according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC , and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively Tables 5 to 7 that are built from bank-level variables (balance sheet, accounting statement, and financial ratios respectively) and country factors (market structure and macroeconomic). The values a > 1 (a < 1) imply that country factors (latent or observed) besides the included ones have an upward (downward) effect on the banks' failure risk. For example, the average estimate for Jordan at about 0.50 means that the latent domestic factors reduce the hazard rate of Jordanian banks by 50%
